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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-POST-MINORITY CHILD SUPPORT IN Disso-
LUTION PROCEEDINGs-Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn. 2d 592, 575
P.2d 201 (1978).
A dissolution decree awarded custody of three minor children to
petitioner wife and ordered respondent husband to provide support
and pay expenses for each child's college education.' Upon the hus-
band's appeal, 2 the Washington Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had exceeded its authority in ordering the husband to provide
child support beyond eighteen years, the age of majority. 3 The court
of appeals concluded that under the 1973 Washington Dissolution
Act4 a parent owes a duty of support only during his children's minor-
ity and that trial courts are without authority to extend that duty in
actions to alter the marital status.5
The wife appealed and the Washington Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the 1973 Dissolution Act authorizes trial courts to order
parental support to continue into a child's majority. 6 On the facts pre-
sented, 7 the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
1. Dr. Childers was ordered to pay support of $150 per month to each of his three
sons until "each son ceases to be enrolled in an accredited school, college or university
as a full-time student pursuing a baccalaureate degree and ceases to be otherwise depen-
dent upon the parties for support," and, furthermore, to pay for "tuition, books, and
miscellaneous educational fees." Childers v. Childers, 15 Wn. App. 792, 793, 552 P.2d
83, 84 (1976). Any of the sons who elected to complete a baccalaureate degree would
likely be twenty-one years old at graduation, three years older than the present age of
majority. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.010 (1976).
2. Dr. Childers also appealed the trial court's order requiring him to support Mrs.
Childers while she pursued a baccalaureate degree. The court of appeals sustained the
trial court's order. Childers v. Childers, 15 Wn. App. 792, 796, 552 P.2d 83, 85-86
(1976). The doctor abandoned this appeal in the Washington Supreme Court. Childers v.
Childers, 89 Wn. 2d 592, 594-95, 575 P.2d 201, 204 (1978).
3. Childers v. Childers, 15 Wn. App. 792, 794-95, 552 P.2d 83, 84-85 (1976).
4. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1976).
5. The court interpreted the Dissolution Act to mean that "the father may be re-
quired to support each child if( 1) he owes such child a duty of support, and (2) the child
is dependent upon him. " Childers v. Childers, 15 Wn. App. 792, 794, 552 P.2d 83, 84
(1976). To construe the "duty of support" language in the Dissolution Act, the court
cited prior Washington cases which followed the common law rule that "'a parent owes a
duty of support to his children only during their minority," the only exception being the
continued duty to support "defective" children. Id. at 794-95, 552 P.2d at 84-85. There-
fore, when the parents' common law duty of support terminated, so did the court's au-
thority to order such support from the parties to the marital action.
6. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wn. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978).
7. The husband was a medical doctor practicing in King County. At trial he was 53
years old and his wife was 45 years old. The wife's only work experience was as a wait-
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post-minority support order,8 including its provision for educational
expenses. : In every case, the necessity for and amount of such support
is a question of fact to be determined by balancing the child's desires
and aptitudes with the parents' station in life and financial re-
sources. 1 0
Because of the increase in the number of dissolutions in the United
States" and the importance of higher education,' 2 there is a need to
reconsider the extent of the parental duty of support and the authority
of divorce courts to order child support for college education. While
the number of jurisdictions sustaining a duty of college support has
increased, few cases extend the obligation into the child's majority.' 3
As a result of the Childers construction of the 1973 Dissolution Act,
Washington law now authorizes trial courts to order post-minority
child support for college education.
This note will first explore the purpose of child support and the
changes in Washington law resulting in the court's construction of the
Dissolution Act in Childers. Following an analysis of the Childers
opinion, the remainder of this note will outline the present operation
and scope of the child support provisions in the Dissolution Act and
ress. The Childers' children lived at home and were not self-supporting at the time the
decree was entered.
8. 89 Wn. 2d at 597-98, 575 P.2d at 205.
9. Pursuit of the college education was to begin immediately after high school and
follow a regular continuous course of study, in the absence of unforeseen circum-
stances. 89 Wn. 2d at 605-06. 575 P.2d at 209.
10. 89 Wn. 2d at 598, 575 P.2d at 205. R.C.W. § 26.09.100 encompasses proceed-
ings for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, mainte-
nance, and child support. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1976). See text accompanying
note 30 infra. Nothing in the Childers opinion suggests that the decision would not apply
to all types of proceedings possible under the Dissolution Act where support of a child is
involved.
II. Over the 21-year period from 1953 to 1974, the annual number of divorces and
annulments in the United States has risen by 250%, while the number of children in-
volved has increased by 333%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SOCIAL INDICATORS 1976, at 43 (December 1977).
12. Higher education has been increasingly considered to be a necessity for a full
and useful life because of the demands of an increasingly complex world. Allison v. Al-
lison, 188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795 (1961) (action for increase in support payments). The
Childers court quoted the following passage from a 1926 Washington opinion:
"It cannot be doubted that the minor who is unable to secure a college education is
generally handicapped in pursuing most of the trades or professions of life, for
most of those with whom he is required to compete will be possessed of that greater
skill and ability which comes from such an education."
89 Wn. 2d at 600, 575 P.2d at 206 (quoting Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174. 182. 224 P.
264. 267 (1926)).
13. See generally Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP.
L. Q. 319. 325 (1971).
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discuss the impact the provisions might have upon custody of chil-
dren.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose of Child Support
In any action affecting the marital status of parents, child support
may be proper ancillary relief; under the 1973 Dissolution Act such
support will normally be entered as part of the dissolution decree."4
The purpose of the support order is to ensure that children of the mar-
riage15 who are unable to support themselves at the time the decree is
entered will receive the reasonable necessities of life. 16 Another func-
tion is to distribute the obligation of support equitably between the
parents.' 7 Thus, the Washington Supreme Court has stated that "an
award to the mother for child support must be predicated upon the
needs of the child and the contribution the mother is able to make, to-
gether with the ability of the father to pay."' 8 The trial court retains
continuing jurisdiction to modify support orders as the parents' finan-
cial capabilities and the child's needs change. 19 This approach gives
the trial court the necessary flexibility to safeguard the welfare of the
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.050 (1976). See generally Rieke, The Dissolution Act
of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375 (1974). See also Holman,
A Law in the Spirit of Conciliation and Understanding: Washington's Marriage Disso-
lution Act, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 39 (1973).
Parents are permitted to allocate support duties between themselves in a separation
contract, but such a contract is not binding upon the court in a dissolution proceeding.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (1976). Therefore, in every action for child support,
the trial court has final responsibility, subject to appellate review, to fix the amount and
purpose of any award of child support.
15. See note 29 infra.
16. See Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wn. 2d 703, 458 P.2d 556 (1964) (no abuse of discre-
tion by trial court in fixing child support at $450 per month for each child). In general,
"reasonable necessities" is not a static concept. It is contingent on both continuing so-
cial redefinition and specific factors such as the parents' financial status and the abilities
and capacities of the child. Haag v. Haag, 240 Ind. 291, 163 N.E.2d 243 (1959). For a
fuller discussion of the idea of "reasonable necessities," see text accompanying notes
69-71 infra.
17. Garrett v. Garrett, 67 Wn. 2d 646, 409 P.2d 470 (1965). See Hinson v. Hinson,
I Wn. App. 348, 461 P.2d 560 (1969).
18. Garrett v. Garrett, 67 Wn. 2d 646, 648, 409 P.2d 470, 472 (1965). Under pre-
sent law, either spouse may be liable for child support. See text accompanying note 30
infra.
19. Herzog v. Herzog, 23 Wn. 2d 382, 161 P.2d 142 (1945). The Washington court
has also noted that "[t he court's jurisdiction to enforce support money judgments is
predicated upon the continued dependency of the children in question." Ditmar v. Dit-
mar, 48 Wn. 2d 373, 374, 293 P.2d 759, 760 (1956).
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child while assuring that the parents' financial health is not strained
beyond reasonable limits.
B. Pre-1973 Law
Prior to the statutory lowering of the age of majority from twenty-
one to eighteen years in 1971,20 the Washington Supreme Court had
recognized the duty of a noncustodial parent to provide support for
minor children pursuing a college education.21 Washington case law22
and express language in the previous Divorce Act 2 3 precluded a state
divorce court from directing a parent to provide child support after
that child attained majority. 24 As long as the age of majority remained
fixed at twenty-one years, the rule against post-minority support
posed few problems. In most cases, economic independence or the
completion of education was likely by age twenty-one.
20. R.C.W. § 26.28.010. enacted in 1971, provides: "Except as otherwise specifi-
cally provided by law, all persons shall be deemed and taken to be of full age for all pur-
poses at the age of eighteen years." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.010 (1976).
21. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 267(1926).
22. Baker v. Baker. 80 Wn. 2d 736, 742, 498 P.2d 315. 319 (1972): Sutherland v.
Sutherland, 77 Wn. 2d 6. 459 P.2d 397 (1969); Evans v. Evans. 116 Wash. 460. 199 P.
764 (1921); Riser v. Riser. 7 Wn. App. 647, 501 P.2d 1069 (1972).
Washington case law recognized two exceptions to the rule against post-minority sup-
port. First, the Washington court recognized that, regardless of age, parents owed a con-
tinuing obligation of support for a mentally or physically handicapped child so long as
support was necessary. Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wn. 2d 390, 229 P.2d 333 1195 1)
(dictum); Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Co., 11I Wash. 351, 190 P. 1007 (1920):
Mallen v. Mallen, 4 Wn. App. 185, 480 P.2d 219 (1971) (dictum).
The second case law exception to the prohibition against orders of post-minority sup-
port permitted enforcement of support into majority when provided by a separation
contract incorporated into a dissolution decree. In Smith v. Smith, 4 Wn. App. 608, 484
P.2d 409 (1971), a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree
required financial support as long as the child attended college as a full-time student.
The court of appeals in Smith concluded that the support provision of the agreement
could be enforced according to its terms through normal contract remedies even though
the obligations under the decree could not be enforced by contempt proceedings after
the child reached majority. See also Bauer v. Bauer, 5 Wn. App. 78 1, 788, 490 P.2d
1350, 1353 (1971).
23. The Divorce Act of 1949 provided: "If the court determines that either party ...
is entitled to a divorce or annulment ... [the court] shall make provision for ... the
custody, support and education of the minor children of such marriage." Divorce Act.
ch. 215, § 1I. 1949 Wash. Laws 698 (1949) (repealed 1973) (emphasis added).
24. The most frequently recognized basis for the rule was "'the fact that there are mi-
nor children to be cared for as wards of the court." Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 55, 165
P. 1063, 1065 (1917). When the child ceased to be a ward of the court at majority.juris-
diction terminated. See generally Note, Child Support Extended, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 933
(1975). In Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn. 2d 373, 374, 293 P.2d 759. 760 (1956). the court
noted that ' [t] he court's jurisdiction to enforce support-money judgments is predicated
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After the age of majority was statutorily lowered to eighteen years,
application of the rule against post-minority support would have ad-
versely affected those children who, while adult by law, had not yet
completed their education and consequently remained dependent on
their parents for support.25 If the lowered age of majority applied in
this setting, the Washington court would have been in the anomalous
position of having recognized the duty of some divorcing parents to
upon the continued dependency of the children in question." The Ditmar court summar-
ily concluded "attainment of majority" terminated dependency. Id. Implicit in the
jurisdictional bar is the policy that a divorce court should be limited in its discretion to
distribute a parent's present and future assets. However arbitrary and impractical, the
rule against post-minority support served that end. Prior to 1973, the Washington court
consistently rejected extension of the divorce courts' jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sutherland
v. Sutherland, 77 Wn. 2d 6. 459 P.2d 397 (1969); Herzog v. Herzog, 23 Wn. 2d 382, 161
P.2d 142 (1945).
25. The Childers court stated:
[i] t should also be noted that not only college is at issue here. Most children have
not graduated from high school by the time they reach their 18th birthday. Thus, the
custodial parent, usually the mother, would be left with the full responsibility for
the child's necessaries while the child is still in high school.
89 Wn. 2d at 601 n.3, 575 P.2d at 207 n.3.
The question whether the lower age of majority applied to the rule against post-mi-
nority support remains an unresolved issue in Washington. This is suggested by two fac-
tors: first, by the absence of any judicial precedent applying the lower age of majority to
the rule against post-minority support, and second, by existing precedent which did not
adopt a blanket application of the change in the age of majority to all rights associated
with an age limitation or qualification. The issue remains significant if, under the 1973
Dissolution Act, a presumption of emancipation arises at the age of majority. See note
60 and accompanying text infra. Should such a presumption arise, it is questionable
whether the lower age of majority would apply.
The bar on post-minority support was incorporated into the Divorce Act of 1949,
when the age of majority in Washington was twenty-one years. Divorce Act, ch. 215, §
11, 1949 Wash. Laws 698 (1949) (repealed 1973). The age of majority was statutorily
lowered to eighteen years in 1971. See note 20 and accompanying text supra. In the in-
terim period before adoption of the Dissolution Act in 1973, the Washington court
never clearly decided whether the new age of majority applied to R.C.W. § 26.08.110.
The court in Baker v. Baker, 80 Wn. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972) stated:
Whether the legislation lowering the age of majority to 18 years applies, under
R.C.W. 26.08. 110, to support and education provisions in divorce decrees ... is
not properly before us at this time since the rights of the parties to this action are
not affected thereby. We therefore do not decide that question.
Id. at 742, 498 P.2d at 319.
Moreover, legislative and judicial precedent demonstrates that attainment of major-
ity has never automatically vested all rights associated with an age qualification. In
Washington State Welfare Rights Organ. v. Washington, 82 Wn. 2d 437, 511 P.2d 990
(1973), the issue was whether the lower age of majority applied to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, which are statutorily contingent on the children
being "dependent." The court held that the two statutes operated independently of each
other. The court reasoned that the two provisions were not inconsistent: R.C.W. § 26.-
08.110 established the legal age of majority; the "dependent children" provision pro-
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support children pursuing a college education, 26 but being unable to
order such support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday.
This problem demonstrates the inherent weakness in the rule
against post-minority support: while it is desirable that the parental
duty of child support terminate at some point, it is difficult to justify
arbitrarily assigning a specific age for all cases.2 7 Indeed, such a rule
requires that support terminate on the occurrence of an event that
bears little relationship to the child's needs.
C. The Dissolution Act of 1973
In 1973, the Washington Legislature substantially revised the exist-
ing Divorce Act, including all of the previous provisions concerning
child support.28 The Act now provides that in "entering a decree of
dissolution ... [t] he court shall consider, approve, or make provision
for ... the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support.."2 9
While the Act does not specifically undertake to define "entitled to
support," it does provide:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, decla-
ration of invalidity, maintenance, or child support, after considering
all relevant factors but without regard to marital misconduct, the court
may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child
of the marriage dependent upon either or both spouses to pay an
amount reasonable or necessary for his support. 30
vided for AFDC benefits under specific conditions. Thus it seems apparent that the leg-
islative proviso. "taken to be of full age for all purposes at the age of 18 years., may not
have automatically altered the age qualification within the rule against post-minority
support.
26. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174. 244 P. 267 (1926).
27. The age of majority was set in I th-century England at twenty-one years be-
cause at that age a male could manage a suit of armor and heft a sword at the same time.
Washburn, supra note 13, at 328 n. 53.
28. Revision of the Act was designed, inter alia, to eliminate the concepts of fault
and guilt from marriage dissolutions. See Rieke, supra note 14, at 377.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.050 (1976). The new Act maintains the "children of
such marriage" limitation embodied in the previous act. Id. § 26.09.100. This limitation
operates to prohibit actions under the Dissolution Act for support of stepchildren and il-
legitimate children. Parents are chargeable for the support of stepchildren until divorce.
Id. § 26.16.205 (amended to include stepchildren in 1969). Although the Dissolution
Act bars direct provision for the support of illegitimate children, the trial court may
take cognizance of the child's needs and the state's interest that provision be made and
adjust the parental obligations to allow support payments to such a child. See Heney v.
Heney, 24 Wn. 2d 445, 459. 165 P.2d 864, 871 (1946).




Conditions for termination of child support orders are also specified
in the Act: "Unless otherwise . . . expressly provided in the decree,
provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation
of the child .... -31
The child support provisions in the new Act reflect the general pur-
pose of the Act: to eliminate the element of "fault" from dissolution
considerations. 32 The 1973 Act repealed the post-minority support
rule in the previous Act 33 but failed to answer the question raised by
the parties in the Childers action: whether the post-minority child sup-
port prohibition contained in the previous Act had been carried into
the new Act.
II. REASONING OF THE CHILDERS COURT
A. Statutory Interpretation
The Washington Supreme Court found from the language of the
Dissolution Act that the legislature intended to remove the jurisdic-
tional bar previously prohibiting an order of post-minority support in
dissolution proceedings. 34 Thus, having established that an order of
post-minority child support was not prohibited by the 1973 Dissolu-
tion Act, the court turned to the criteria enumerated in the Act to de-
termine whether the trial court had abused its discretion by ordering
support for the college education of the Childers' children. 35 The
3 1. Id. §26.09.170 (1976).
32. See note 28 supra.
33. Divorce Act, ch. 215. § 11. 1949 Wash. Laws 698 (1949).
34. The court relied on three factors. First, the 1973 Act eliminated all reference to
minority. The court found that a change was intended by the change in wording from the
old support provision language, referring to "minor" children, to the new support provi-
sion, referring to "dependent" children. 84 Wn. 2d at 596, 575 P.2d at 204 (referring to
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1976)). Second, R.C.W. § 26.09.110 authorized appoint-
ment of an attorney for a minor or dependent child; because the court found the term to
be used in the disjunctive, dependent child could not mean minor child. Id. at 595, 575
P.2d at 204. Third, R.C.W. § 26.09.170 indicated that the courts could expressly provide
a time other than emancipation of the child for termination of support. Id. at 596-97,
575 P.2d at 204-05. The court noted that the construction of R.C.W. § 26.09.170
adopted by the court of appeals would render the entire provision meaningless. Id. at
596-97, 575 P.2d at 205 (1978).
R.C.W. § 26.09.170 is virtually identical to the equivalent section of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act. The official comment to that section states: "Subsection (c)
is designed to permit the ... court to provide in the decree that the obligation of each
parent to support the child will extend beyond the child's emancipation .... UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 316(c) (commissioner's note), reprinted in 9 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED 455, 501 (master ed. 1973).
35. 89 Wn. 2d at 598, 575 P.2d at 205.
465
Washington Law Review
standards the court applied are those set out in R.C.W. § 26.09.100:
that the children be "dependent" and that the parent owe them a duty
of support.36
The Childers court gave both a general and a specific definition of
dependency. The court found a "dependent" to be "one who looks to
another for support and maintenance, one who is in fact dependent,
one who relies on another for the reasonable necessities of life." 3 7
Whether a child is a dependent is a question of fact to be determined
by all the circumstances of the particular case.38 More specifically,
the court noted that it was within the discretion of the trial court to
find the Childers' children to be "dependents" based on their status as
students pursuing a baccalaureate degree. 39
The court found a parental duty of support based on the Washing-
ton family expense statute. 40 Relying on its decision in Esteb v. Es-
teb,41 the court noted that the divorcing parents' duty had been previ-
36. Id. at 597. 575 P.2d at 205.
37. Id. at 598. 575 P.2d at 205.
38. The court stated:
Age is but one factor. Other factors would include the child's needs, prospects, de-
sires, aptitudes, abilities, and disabilities, and the parents' level of education. stan-
dard of living, and current and future resources. Also to be considered is the
amount and type of support (i.e., the advantages, educational and otherwise) that
the child would have been afforded if his parents had stayed together.
Id.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act enumerates the following factors to be con-
sidered by the trial court when ordering child support:
(I) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent:
(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been
dissolved;
(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs;
and the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309, reprinted in 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
455, 494 (master ed. 1973).
39. The court reasoned as follows:
[W] e think it reasonable to assume that a medical doctor, himself with years of
higher education which brings him a higher than average income, would willingly
treat his sons as dependents if they chose and showed an aptitude for college, but
for the fact of the divorce. Where, as here, the children would have most likely re-
mained dependent on their father past 18 while they obtained a college education,
it is within the discretion of the trial court to define them as dependents for that
purpose.
89 Wn. 2d at 598-99, 575 P.2d at 205-06.
40. "The expenses of the family and the education of the children ... are chargeable
upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto
they may be sued jointly or separately .... ." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (1976).




ously extended to support for a college education. The court,
however, was careful to emphasize that the duty to support was not
absolute, 42 but rather depended on such circumstances as whether the
duty imposed on the parent any significant hardship and whether the
child showed aptitude.43 The court found the duty to provide post-
secondary support justified by the facts of the case.44
B. Constitutionality of the Post-Minority Support Interpretation
The court of appeals in Childers v. Childers45 had considered, sua
sponte, the constitutionality of an earlier decision which held that
post-minority child support could be ordered under the Dissolution
Act.46 In the opinion of the court of appeals, such an interpretation of
the Act violated the privileges and immunities provision of the Wash-
ington Constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution.47 According to the
court, the fact that married parents could legally terminate support
for their children at majority while divorced parents could be com-
pelled to provide post-minority support created a statutory class re-
ceiving disparate treatment. The court of appeals thought that the
constitutional infirmity lay in the fact that no logical reason existed to
"require divorced parents to support their children for an indefinite
42. 89 Wn. 2d at 600, 575 P.2d at 206, citing Golay v. Golay, 35 Wn. 2d 122,
123-24, 210 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1949).
43. 89 Wn. 2d at 601, 575 P.2d at 207.
44. id.
45. 15 Wn. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83(1976).
46. Melville v. Melville, 1 Wn. App. 879, 526 P.2d 1228 (1974), involved a disso-
lution decree, entered under the new Act, which ordered the husband to pay support for
the child "until the age of 21 if the child was regularly enrolled in school." Id. at 880, 526
P.2d at 1229. The husband challenged the order on appeal, contending that the divorce
court's jurisdiction terminated when the child reached eighteen years. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the support order, concluding, "RCW 26.09.170 specifically confers
upon a dissolution court jurisdiction to direct a parent to provide for the support and
education of a child after it attains majority .... Id. at 881, 526 P.2d at 1229.
The Melville court reasoned that although the previous Divorce Act prevented Wash-
ington courts from ordering post-minority support in an action to change marital status,
Section 26.09.170 of the new Act was intended by the legislature to expand the courts'
jurisdiction. In the Melville court's opinion, the phrase in the new Act "expressly pro-
vided in the decree" implied that a divorce court can prevent termination of the "eman-
cipated" child's authorized support by entering post-minority support orders in the
divorce decree. Therefore, while section 26.09.170 of the Dissolution Act does not spe-
cifically provide for post-minority support, the operation of the statute permits the court
to do so.
47. 15 Wn. App. at 795, 552 P.2d at 85.
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period into their majority while married parents are free to bid their
children a fiscal farewell at age 18."48
The supreme court disagreed, finding that the classification of mar-
ried and divorced parents resulted in no actual inequality, and that if
it did, there existed a rational basis for the difference in treatment. 49
In family circumstances both economically and academically condu-
cive to college education, the child would normally pursue the degree
but for the dissolution. Therefore, by providing for post-minority
child support in dissolution proceedings, trial courts were only pro-
viding the affected child with the benefits children of married parents
retained. Moreover, the classification was justified by the legitimate
state interests in minimizing the disadvantages-disruptions to home
life, bitterness, and emotional turmoil-that a dissolution visits upon
the "innocent" child, in insuring that children are properly provided
for, and in promoting a well-educated citizenry. 50
II. OPERATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS
The Childers decision was the Washington Supreme Court's first
opportunity to articulate the standards the trial court must follow
when exercising its support order authority under the Dissolution Act.
The remainder of this note will outline the present scope and opera-
tion of the Act's support provisions in light of the Childers decision
and suggest potential problems and possible guidelines for trial courts
and parties to actions affecting the marital status.
The Dissolution Act makes possible two types of support obliga-
tions in dissolution proceedings: court-ordered support that termi-
nates upon "emancipation" of the child,5 1 and court-ordered support
that continues beyond "emancipation" of the child when "expressly
provided" for in the decree.52
48. Id. at 796, 552 P.2d at 85.
49. 89 Wn. 2d at 605. 575 P.2d at 209.
50. Id. at 601-05, 575 P.2d at 207-09. See Inker and McGrath. College Education
of Minors, Part I, BOSTON B.J., May 1966, at 5.
5 1. R.C.W. § 26.09.170 also provides for child support provisions to terminate
upon "the death of the parent obligated to support the child." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.-
170 (1976). It is beyond the scope of this note to examine termination of the support or-
der upon death of the parent. See O'Neal v. Morris, 7 Wn. App. 157, 498 P.2d 362
(1972).




A. Termination Upon Emancipation
As noted previously, R.C.W. § 26.09.170 states that unless the trial
court expressly provides otherwise, emancipation of the child termi-
nates provisions for support.53 The Dissolution Act does not define
the word "emancipation," but the doctrine of emancipation has been
well developed in Washington common law.
54
In general, emancipation of a child is the relinquishment by the
parent of care, control, and custody of the child with the concomitant
termination of the parental duty to support the child.55 The doctrine
represents the legal recognition that certain events, such as marriage,
military service, or incarceration, may terminate the economic depen-
dence the child has upon her parents and cause her to be emancipated
"in fact" prior to reaching majority.56 Upon reaching majority, the
child is emancipated "by operation of law," thereby terminating the
parental duty of support.57
As interpreted by the supreme court, the Dissolution Act alters this
dual definition of emancipation by eliminating emancipation "by op-
eration of law." The court was careful to note that emancipation, as
used in the Act, was to be determined by factors in addition to age.58
Moreover, the Act's reference only to emancipation "in fact" is conso-
53. See text accompanyng note 31 supra.
54. Foran v. Kallio, 56 Wn. 2d 769, 355 P.2d 544 (1960); Hines v. Cheshire, 36 Wn.
2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950); American Prods. Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wn. 2d 246, 109 P.2d
570(1941); Reedy v. Reedy, 12 Wn. App. 844, 532 P.2d 626 (1975).
55. See 59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent and Child §§ 93-100 (1971); H. CLARK, JR., DoMES-
TIc RELATIONS §8.3 (1968).
56. In Ditmar v. Ditmar, 48 Wn. 2d 373, 293 P.2d 759 (1956), the court noted:
It follows that a mother cannot compel payments of support money for children
whose dependency upon her has ceased by reason of death, emancipation by mar-
riage, attainment of majority, service in the Armed Forces of the United States,
adoption, incarceration in penal or other custodial institutions, or economic suffi-
ciency resulting from earnings, gifts, or inheritance. In the absence of specific pro-
visions to the contrary, there is a necessary implication in every decree for child
support, that its binding effect shall extend into the future only for the period dur-
ing which the children's dependency upon their custodian continues.
Id. at 374-75, 293 P.2d at 760. See also Anderson v. Anderson, 27 Wn. 2d 122, 177
P.2d 83 (1947); Troyer v. Troyer, 177 Wash. 88, 30 P.2d 963 (1954); Penney v. Penney,
151 Wash. 328, 275 P. 710 (1929); Poland v. Poland, 63 Wash. 597, 116 P. 2 (1911).
57. Reedy v. Reedy, 12 Wn. App. 844, 532 P.2d 626 (1975).
58. 89 Wn. 2d at 597, 575 P.2d at 205. The court also noted: "We find the common
meaning of'emancipate' in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (197 1):
'1: to release (a child) from the paternal power, making the person released suijuris.'
It is not absolutely linked to majority."
Id. at 597 n.l, 575 P.2d at 205 n.l.
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nant with legislative intent to eliminate minority status as a qualifica-
tion for child support.5 9
The Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the "emancipa-
tion" language in R.C.W. § 26.09.170 has significant bearing on the
trial court's decision as to when termination of child support is appro-
priate. A child support order should terminate only when the child is
emancipated "in fact," even if emancipation occurs after the age of
eighteen. The attainment of majority should operate only to raise the
presumption of emancipation-a presumption which can be rebutted
by evidence of continuing reasonable dependency. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held similarly in Straver v. Straver:
There is no age fixed in the law when a child becomes emancipated.
Prior to twenty-one there is a presumption against it, and the burden
of establishing the status by competent evidence is on him who asserts
it .... Even "arrival at the age of 21 years does not ipso facto result in
emancipation. Arrival at majority is prima facie but not necessarily
emancipation.""0
B. Support Extending Beyond Emancipation
As noted previously, under the new Dissolution Act a support order
will terminate upon emancipation of the child unless expressly pro-
vided otherwise in the decree." This provision grants trial courts the
authority to order support for activities of the child that, if the marital
community had remained intact, would lie wholly within the discre-
tion of the child's parents, for example, pursuit of a baccalaureate de-
gree. 62 As noted by the Childers court, the Dissolution Act provides
59. Id. at 596. 575 P.2d at 204-05. At the present time it is not clear whether the ju-
dicial restriction of the emancipation doctrine to emancipation "in fact" in support pro-
ceedings might affect the duty of married parents to provide child support. There has
been no case confronting that issue since the age of majority was lowered to eighteen
years.
60. Straver v. Straver, 59 A.2d 39, 41 (NJ. Ch. 1948) (quoting Goldstein v. Gold-
stein, 134 A. 184 (N.J. Misc. 1926)).
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170(1976).
62. When a trial court in a dissolution proceeding makes provision for the minimal
child support required of every parent (i.e., nurture per se), the court assumes no special
protective role. It acts as any court of proper jurisdiction would when presented with a
parent, married or divorced, delinquent in his or her child support obligation. When the
parents seek to alter their marital status, the locus parentis shifts from the parents to the
dissolution court. The primary concern of the court becomes the welfare of the child.
and it seeks to mitigate as far as possible the detrimental impact of dissolution upon the




that such extended support can be ordered only when the child is "de-
pendent" and the parents owe a "duty of support. ' 63 When the trial
court provides for support that does not terminate upon the child's
emancipation, an initial showing of dependency is easily established.
In cases of support for the pursuit of a college education, the child is
often dependent on his parents simply because of his voluntary ab-
sence from the job market. Regardless of the self-imposed quality of
the dependence, the child nevertheless remains "dependent" on the
parents for support. Moreover, the Childers court provided that the
trial court could characterize as dependent for support purposes64
children who would likely remain dependent on their parents past
eighteen while they pursued a college education. The test of the rea-
sonableness of the child's dependency, for example, whether pursuit
of a baccalaureate degree should be permitted at all, does not arise
until the court considers the question of the parental duty of support.
R.C.W. § 26.09.100 provides that in every child support case be-
fore the trial court, the parental duty of support, not "dependency" of
the child, is to be determined by a balancing of "all relevant fac-
tors." 65 When the trial court, acting in loco parentis,6 6 seeks to extend
child support beyond the mandatory nurture per se,6 7 the central issue
in every case is to what reasonable goals and purposes support should
be applied. This determination should turn primarily upon the social,
not individual, perception of the need for that goal.68 Thus, support
for college education can be ordered by the trial court because of the
evolving social view that higher education is necessary to prepare a
child adequately for the demands of modern society.6 9 The reason-
ableness of the support goal depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case before the court. Whether support for pursuit of a bac-
calaureate degree can be ordered turns on the child's aptitudes and in-
terests and the parents' financial status and level of education.70 Fi-
beyond nurture per se to serve the best interests of the child. See Inker & McGrath, Col-
lege Education of Minors, Part 11, BOSTON B.J., June 1966, at 14-15.
63. See notes 36-44 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1976).
66. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
67. "Nurture per se" as used throughout this note refers to those minimal elements
of child support, i.e., food, clothing, shelter, that a parent cannot withhold from her
child.
68. See Crane v. Crane, 45 Il1. App. 2d 316, 196 N.E.2d 27(1964).
69. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
70. Garrett v. Garrett. 67 Wn. 2d 646, 409 P.2d 470 (1965); Gaidos v. Gaidos, 48
Wn. 2d 276, 293 P.2d 388 (1956).
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nally, the appropriateness of the support purpose must be measured in
light of the dissolution court's duty to minimize the disadvantages
suffered by the children of broken homes 71 and the need to "perpetu-
ate for the children ... a standard of living in some degree compatible
with that provided them before the divorce."7 2
IV. AN UNRESOLVED ISSUE: CUSTODY OF THE
CHILD
In removing the post-minority support bar in actions affecting the
marital status, the Childers decision raises difficulties in relation to
custody of the child. For example, what degree of control may a non-
custodial parent who has been ordered to provide a college education
for her child exercise over the lifestyle of that child while he attends
college?
The Washington Court of Appeals has held that the divorce court's
jurisdiction in "child" custody proceedings terminates when the child
reaches majority;73 thus, parental and judicial control over the child's
custody terminates. However, post-minority support can be compelled
when the divorce court determines that college is in the best interests
of the child and orders support "so long as the child is a full-time stu-
dent."74 This creates the prospect of a child of divorced parents re-
ceiving support for education with no attendant controls for as long as
the child maintains the full-time status. Married parents have the
discretion to make continued college support contingent on certain
rules of behavior.75 A divorced parent under the Dissolution Act may
be ordered to provide college support, with the possibility that neither
the parents nor the court may be able to exercise authority over the
child's conduct or progress while at college. When a divorced parent
refuses to continue paying college support unless he (or someone else)
can exercise some control over the child attending college, the court
will have to reexamine its interpretation of jurisdiction in child cus-
tody proceedings or reevaluate the terms of child support obligations
to be imposed on the parent.
71. 89 Wn. 2d at 604, 575 P.2d at 208.
72. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wn. 2d 703, 706. 458 P.2d 556, 557-58 (1969).
73. Dickson v. Dickson, 12 Wn. App. 183, 529 P.2d 476 (1974).
74. Post-minority support awards for college education are often contingent on the
child remaining a full-time student. See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 15 Wn. App. 792.
793, 552 P.2d 83, 84 (1976).





Despite uncertainty in the application of R.C.W. § 26.09.100, the
Childers decision is to be welcomed for its rejection of the rule against
post-minority child support in dissolution proceedings. Washington
trial courts may now fully consider the needs of the children of di-
vorcing parents, unencumbered by the artificial and unrealistic rule
that child support must end when majority is reached regardless of the
child's status or needs. The Childers decision is a just accommodation
of parental responsibilities and capabilities and the rights of their chil-
dren in the diffiicult times accompanying a dissolution proceeding.
Patrick Charles Marshall
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